1937-38 – Interpretation One
- ‘Well done Chamberlain!’
- Chamberlain kept the spectre of war at bay for as long as he could, giving peace a chance
- Popular majority view
- In 1938, there was some opposition to Appeasement but most of the population approved of what Chamberlain did at Munich
- Chamberlain was hailed as a hero when he returned to Britain from signing the Munich Agreement
- When he returned, thousands lined the rainy streets to meet him whilst he received tens of thousands of letters / telegrams of support
- Only one minister resigned because of it whilst others were even more supportive of the policy than Chamberlain himself
- Lord Halifax was one of the ministers who supported Appeasement more than Chamberlain
- Joseph Kennedy (US ambassador to Britain) was also a strong supporter
- This opinion came about due to the people remembering WWI and not believing that it was worth fighting for Czechoslovakia
- The euphoria was short-lived as people soon began to feel guilty for Britain not helping Czechoslovakia and not standing up against Hitler
- The people realised that Appeasement had not created lasting peace
- Winston Churchill, then a politician was a powerful critic of the policy, along with political cartoonist David Low and others
1939-48 – Interpretation Two
- The ‘Guilty Men’
- Appeasement was a foolish, cowardly and immoral policy that strengthened the dictators and weakened Britain
- Popular and political view
- The outbreak of WWII caused this major change in attitudes
- This immense shift in attitude may have been based on a short book published by Cato (three journalists) called ‘Guilty Men’
- It explained that Britain had strengthened the dictators since 1931 by making concessions to Japan, then Italy, then Germany
- Simultaneously, British leaders were failing to prepare Britain for war and ignoring the dictators’ plans, weakening Britain
- The appeasers were portrayed to be on a par with the dictators
- Key historians who agreed with this viewpoint were Frederik Lovegall and Kenneth Osgood
- Lovegall and Osgood wrote in 2010 that “’Munich’ and ‘appeasement’ have been among the dirtiest words in American politics” and that “As Truman put it in 1948: ‘Appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately to war.’”
- When Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, it was the changing point in attitudes, which were hardened after the war broke out
- Britain was being defeated and people called for a new Prime Minister
- People looked for a scapegoat, the obvious one being Chamberlain, he resigned, and Winston Churchill took over
- Churchill, who wanted to continue fighting, clashed with Lord Halifax who wanted to make peace with Hitler
- Initially, it looked like Churchill may lose to Halifax, however newspaper publisher Lord Beaverbrook was a close friend of Churchill and he published and promoted Cato’s ‘Guilty Men’
- In the short term, this opinion had enormous impact
- It was key for Churchill to defeat Halifax, who left government soon after
- However, in 1945, it helped to unseat Churchill himself
- In that year’s general election, the Labour Party exploited the fact that both Appeasement and Churchill were under the Conservative Party to help them win the election and further damage Churchill’s historical reputation
- In the long term, this interpretation turned Appeasement into a dirty word globally, nobody wanted to be accused of such a thing for a long time
- At the time, there was no challenge to this view, however later historian became very critical of ‘Guilty Men’ as a historical piece of writing
- Derrek Dutton wrote in 2011 that “Overall, ‘Guilty Men’ is less accurate as an assessment of Britain’s political leadership in the 1930s than as a lasting influence on how people saw Appeasement” and that the book itself is a “black and white depiction of complex issues” and “showed no understanding of the terrible dilemmas which confronted policy makers”
1948-60s – Interpretation Three
- The Appeasers Misjudged Hitler
- Even if Appeasement was based on good motives, it was a terrible misjudgement and miscalculation
- Churchill (orthodox) view
- After WWII, there was a reassessment of the events that lead to it, Winston Churchill was most influential in this view
- After the end of WWII and Churchill’s loss of the election, he devoted much of his time to writing his history of WWII
- In it, he was critical of the Appeasement policy but not of Chamberlain as a man
- He also claimed to be the only opposition to the policy and that Chamberlain should have tried to put together a ‘grand alliance’ of Britain, France, the USA and the USSR to stop Germany, Japan and Italy
- This interpretation came about for two important contextual factors
- The ‘Churchill Factor’ – Churchill was well known for his self-promotion and wrote the book to ensure his reputation did not suffer since the loss of the general election
- The Cold War – Churchill used the book as an opportunity to convince Britain that as one of the USA’s allies, they should stand up to Josef Stalin and the USSR which he deemed as a threat to Europe
- Churchill wrote his opinions in ‘The Gathering Storm’ and believed that it was impossible no to refer to the “long series of miscalculations and misjudgements which he made” but that “the motives which inspired him have never been questioned” and that he had the “highest degree of moral courage”
- A review of the US TV documentary from 1960 based on the book, stated that Churchill was “a lone voice whose vibrant words were ignored” and was “forecasting the holocaust which Adolf Hitler would unleash”
- In 2003, British prime minister Tony Blair commented that “Chamberlain was a hero” but “he was a good man who made a bad decision”
- Although it wasn’t true that Churchill was a lone oppose to the policy, his story was widely accepted due to his prestige of leading Britain through the war
- Throughout the 1940s and 50s, no academic historians challenged his account and it became the accepted view of Appeasement
- Later, many politicians used his view as reason for their wartime decisions
- There was little challenge to Churchill’s interpretation, apart from in more recent years when historians have been critical of Churchill’s version of events
1960s-90s – Interpretation Four
- Rehabilitating Chamberlain
- Chamberlain was in an impossible position and he did the best he could under the circumstances
- Academic revisionist view
- A new group of historians challenged the orthodox view
- A.J.P Taylor was the first historian to question the orthodox view in 1961, arguing that in the 1930s Hitler didn’t have a plan and simply grasped opportunities coming his way, and as a result Chamberlain could have done no better as even Hitler didn’t know what he was going to do next
- This view was not accepted by most historians, but it did start a revisionist process
- In 1965, historian Donald Cameron Watt argued that Hitler was only one of Chamberlain’s many problems and he had very limited options
- In the late 1960s, historians conducted studies on all these other problems and resolved that there was little else Chamberlain could’ve done
- Some historians argued even further to say that Appeasement was the right policy as it bought Britain time to build up its armed forces, others even praised Chamberlain for his policy
- Three British historians; Donald Cameron Watt, Paul Kennedy and David Dilks all supported the academic revisionist view
- In 1965, Watt stated that “historians are now concerned to understand the processes which German and British politicians went through and the different kinds of advice they were receiving and the pressures that were on them”
- In 1981, Kennedy wrote in his book that appeasement was a “natural policy for a small island state gradually losing its place in world affairs”
- In 1972, Dilks stated that Chamberlain was a “master politician” who pursued the “best, perhaps the only, policy possible in the difficult circumstances of Britain’s declining power”
- The opinion had come about due to three factors
- Radical thinking had become fashionable and everyone was questioning traditional opinions at the time
- In the Vietnam War, the USA were against the Appeasement policy and their war was going badly – suggesting that if Britain hadn’t utilised the policy, they would’ve lost the war
- In 1958, the government passed a law that meant government documents from 30 years ago (rather than the previous 50 years ago) could be accessed; this meant that by the late 1960s, huge numbers of government documents were available which showed all the concerns that Chamberlain and his ministers had
- Economic problems – Britain could not afford a war as the Treasury blocked Chamberlain’s plans to increase the armed forces
- Public opinion – for a democracy to fight a war, the public had to back the government and Chamberlain didn’t believe that was the case
- The military – British military commanders didn’t believe their forces could win if there was a war
- The USA – Chamberlain and his ministers knew that the USA was not a reliable ally and wouldn’t involve itself with European problems
- Fear of the USSR – chamberlain was also concerned about the threat of Stalin, not only Hitler
- The empire – the dominions (Britain’s key allies in its empire – Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand) were unsure about a war with Germany, also the empire was occupied with other problems
- The public and political view remained unchanged, however this interpretation was widely accepted and debated among historians
- The challenge to this interpretation is the next one
1990s-2000s – Interpretation Five
- Chamberlain Back on Trial
- Chamberlain’s personality was a key part of the problem, others could have dealt with the situation satisfactorily
- Academic counter-revisionist view
- As what usually happens, others had an opposite take on the prior interpretation
- Historians began to question that Chamberlain had no choice in his actions of the 1930s
- Robert Parker was the first historian to develop this view publicly and others agreed
- Parker wrote that Hitler “appealed to Chamberlain’s vanity and encouraged Chamberlain to think he had a special influence over him”
- Their main arguments were
- Chamberlain overrated his abilities and importance in thinking that he could talk Hitler out of his irrationality
- Chamberlain failed to understand Hitler as he couldn’t change his own views on international relations
- Chamberlain ignores the advice of his colleagues
- Whatever the reason for Appeasement, Chamberlain should be held responsible for the betrayal of Czechoslovakia
- There were two main drivers of this interpretation
- The historians felt it was their job to find new interpretations and to criticise and refine earlier ones, others also believed it was unfair to let Chamberlain off the hook for Appeasement
- In 1989, at the end of the Cold War, the USSR enabled archives from WWII to be available to historians, as well as Soviet documents, they had German ones as well which they had taken from Berlin at the end of WWII which gave an insight into the dealings of Hitler with Chamberlain
- The counter-revisionist view had little impact on the public or politics, yet still today it causes debate amongst historians
- Previous historians reviewed their opinions and believed that this was a better interpretation
- The counter-revisionist view was challenged by the revisionists who were still around at the time
- Their main argument against it was asking what other alternatives were open to Chamberlain
Explain why not all historians would agree with Interpretation C. [20]
Do you think most historians and commentators would agree with Interpretation D? [20]
How fair is Interpretation A on Chamberlain? [25]
How far do you accept the view of Interpretation B on Appeasement? [25]