By the end of 1944, the tide of war had turned decisively against Germany. The Red army had overrun much of East Central Europe and millions of refugees were felling to the west. But the final defeat of Germany took many months and cost millions of lives.
Victory over Germany was a Soviet achievement, but the rewards of victory did not come quickly or painlessly. Abroad, relations with the Western Allies were difficult. Within the USSR, more sacrifices were demanded of the people to carry through post-war reconstruction.
The defeat of the Germans:
Germans fought to the bitter end, partly because the Allies insisted on an unconditional surrender. This slowed the Red Army’s advance e but could not stop it. By early 1945, the USSSR had a huge superiority in men, weapons and war production.
Stalin wanted the Red Army to gain control of as much of Central Europe and Germany as possibly by the end of the war. This was because he wanted a buffer zone against any future threats to the USSSR. Stalin was willing to accept hu casualty rates in the Red Arm in order to advance westwards as fast as possible.
US General Eisenhower agreed to slow the Allies’ advance into Germany from the wet to allow the USSR to win the race to Berlin. This was partly because Stalin. Insisted on speed rather than careful planning.
Germany surrendered unconditionally to the USSR on 9th May 1945. Hitler had committed suicide on 30th April and the Red Army won the final battle for Berlin on 2nd May 1945.
Reasons for the defeat of the Germans:
Human weaknesses:
Hitler’s arrest was based on securing a rapid victory, once this failed the odds were against Germany. From December 1941, had to fight a two-front war.
Germany lacked self-sufficiency in raw materials.
By 1934-44, resources became a problem.
Hitler made crucial strategic mistakes. He replaced experienced generals with ‘yes men’.
Harsh German repression in occupied countries increased resistance movement and partisans.
Soviet strengths:
The USSR’s vast geographical size:
German supply lines were stretched too far by the end of 1941
The size of the USSR enabled whole new armies, and a whole new industrial base, to be built up in the east, beyond Germany’s reach
Population size: the USSR could replace losses in a way that was impossible for Germans.
Natural resources wealth from 1943 the USSR could out-produce German war industries.
The Soviet ‘command economy’: well suited to total war and the emergency mobilisation of workers and resources.
Military leadership: after a bad start, Stalin’s Stavka became ruthlessly effective,
Propagandas and patriotism motivated the armed forces and civilians to fight and endure.
The contributions by the Allies`.
Stalin’s allies meant Hitler was fighting on two fronts
Mass bombings campaigns by the British and Americans from 1943 inflicted huge damage on German’s war effort,
Allied secretly intelligence gained b code-breaking, undermined Germany’s war effort at crucial times.
Enormous amounts of vital military and economic aid poured into the USSR.
The results of victory for the USSR:
The USSR became a superpower:
The war unleashed the USSR’s economic potential
The war badly weakened other European powers
Communist ideology was vindicated:
Communist was seen to defeat fascism
This increased the attraction of a ‘socialist road’ to development
Stalin was held up as the USSR’s saviour:
The cult of Stalin was strengthened.
There was a massive territorial expansion of the USSR and its sphere of influence:
The Baltic States became Soviet republics
Pro-Soviet regimes were established in Eastern European countries
There were devastating costs for the USSR:
At least 20 million Soviet citizens were killed
Much of the economy and infrastructure were destroyed
Cold War tensions developed:
Stalin feared the USA’s influence in Europe
There were disagreements over the future of Germany
Post- war reconstruction: industry:
Stalin promised in 1945 that the USSR would be the world’s leading industrial power by 1960. Gosplan workers on a fourth FYP – 1945, launching in March 1946. Reconstruction of Ukraine was a particular focus, as it was an important industrial and agriculture region that had been devastated by the war.
Soviet industry faced major problems in adjusting peacetime conditions:
In 1945, mining production, electricity generation and steel production were around half of 1940 levels,
The transport infrastructure was badly disrupted.
The workforce was exhausted and depleted by wartime sacrifices.
The end of foreign aid added significantly to pressures on industry.
A high investment in military production as a result of the Cold War meant less investment in other areas.
However, industrial recovery under the 4th FYP was rapid and successful:
Many if the Plan’s targets were met or exceeded. For example, more coal, oil, steel, cement and electricity were all being produced in 1950 compared to 1940.
By 1950, Ukraine’s industrial output was also higher than before the war.
There was also some improved production of consumer goods under the 4th FYP, for example, cotton fabrics, wool fabric and sugar were back to pre-war production figures by 1950.
Behind pre-war levels, which has already been inadequate to meet demand
As early as 1948, average Soviet incomes were back to 1938 levels
Reasons for the rapid recovery included:
War reparations transferred masses of material from Germany to the USSR
Central planning was able to enforce the mass mobilisation of people and resources
The people were proud of the USSR’s victory an willing to make further sacrifices
A rebound effect enabled rapid rebuilding of essential services
Post-war reconstruction: agriculture:
Agriculture in 1945 faced major challenges:
Large numbers of farms had been destroyed in the war
Large quantities of farm machinery had been destroyed and livestock numbers were also seriously depleted.
Food production in 1945 was at 60% of 1940 levels.
Deaths and injuries from the war meant a major shortage of farming labour
1946 was also the direst year since 1891, and famine hit parts of Ukraine and central Russia in 1946-47, killing an estimated 1,5 mil people.
While other parts of the economy recovered quickly, agriculture’s recovery was slow and patchy:
The 4th FYP brought some increases but failed to reach most of its targets
Famine in 1946-47 highlighted the serious problems faced in agriculture.
Stalin’s writings on the Soviet economy blocked reform in agriculture. For example, payments for farm products were still kept very low, taxes were increased, and in 1948 a ban on selling food grown on ‘kolkhozniks’ private plots was reintroduced.