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Government, Propaganda and Foreign Relations:

Stalin’s style of government:

Stalin showed great political skill in his rise to power, successfully handling difficult alliances and rivalries, always managing to present a moderate image. Stain always understood the advantages of his central position in the Party, especially his grip on the bureaucracy through his post as General Secretary & bureaucratic centralism key to his style of government. In Stalin’s system factionalism – crime against Party. Once the party line has been set out by the leader, backed by majorities in Party committees & Politburo – dissent equated to disloyalty. Stalin’s government was always presented as a continuation of Lenin’s legacy, with all pervasive reminders to politicians and to the people that Stalin has been Lenin’s closest comrade. Stalin’s style of government was also built on the politics of divide and rule. Stalin’s success in the power struggle owed much to his ability to build up a group of loyal supporters in the lower levels of the party leadership, men who were of crucial importance in helping Stalin to outmanoeuvre him, he placed rivals but who owed their political position entirely to Stalin. Stalin’s loyal henchmen were essential to his dictatorship, but they were constantly in fear not only of Stalin but also of each other. Fear was perhaps the driving factor in Stalin’s system go government. Fear permeated the imposition of Stalin’s political, in the year collectivisation was imposed, in the way officials were intimidated in the extensive use of the secret police and its growth of forced labour camps. The sinister role of the secret police was nothing new in 1929. Cheka was used as a political weapon. Along with propaganda – repression was constant theme in Soviet government. The use of terror reached greater heights. Lenin had frequently spoken frankly about the need to use of terror; Stalin claimed with justification that he was continuing Lenin’s rule in this regard. Repression was not only the business of the secret police: it was often used by government officials enforcing government policies on peasants and workers.

Foreign policy:

  • USSR need trade partners however permanent revolution mentality – aggression (Comintern)
  • GB – 1926 – general strike, 1924 –Zinoviev letter, war scare – 1927
    • 1925 – Locarno – slightly closer
  • Germany – 1922 – Rapallo, 1926 – Treaty of Berlin
    • Germany trains Red Army, USSR provides facilities to manufacture German goods
  • Japan – 1905 – Russo-Japanese War, CW – fought for Whites, imperial aims, occupy Vladivostok
  • US – only recognise USSR in 1933
  • France – no treaties but no aggression – halfway
  • Lenin – trade, but revolution should continue
  • Stalin = peaceful co-existence, Socialism in 1 country
  • Chicherin = Commissar for Foreign Affairs – 1918-1930
    • Anti-GB, pro-Germany
    • Believed that security came if capitalist countries were disunited – peaceful co-existence
  • Factors that affected Soviet foreign policy: fear of invasion, need for Western help to overcome economic backwardness, background of commissars/leaders, internal situation, attitudes of other countries, Marxist ideology

China:

Chinese Communist Party, formed in 1921, hoped to carry through a communist revolution in China and expected support from Stalin and the Comintern. However, Stalin preferred to back Jiang Jieshi, leader of the revolutionary nationalist movement. Stalin therefore pushed the CCP to join forces with the Guomindang in an  ‘alliance from within’. But – this did not happen; there was bitter conflict:

March 1926 – GMD – massacred striking workers in Canton & established military dictatorship

April 1927, GMD – viciously suppressed communist led workers’ revolt in Shanghai and thousands of workers were skilled.

1927 –  GMD – massacred striking workers in the city f Wuhan c30,000 workers were skilled by GMD in 1927.Rresponding to events in Chins – 1925 to 1927 – Stalin’s concerns was for stability in Russia, not spreading revolution to other countries. Since Stalin believed the Guomindgang was the strongest force in China, help gave Jiang Jieshi financial backing and military help – Stalin also pressured Politburo into accepting the Guomindgang as a member of the Comintern. In Stalin’s eyes, anything that had gone wrong in China. Was the fault of the communists who moved away from supporting the urban working class and focused on the peasantry? Links between the VVP and Soviet Union became weaker.

Stalin’s betrayal of the CCP – bitterly critiqued by Trotsky and the left opposition but Stalin’s policy of socialism in one country had wide support in the party and Trotsky’s influence was waning although the communist Party Congress of December 1927 was the occasion for much criticism of Stalin’s actions over China. It was also the congress that expelled Trostky from the Party.

Germany & Treaty of Berlin:

First breakthrough – normalising relations between USSR & the wider world has been the Treaty of Rapallo – Weimar Germany signed in 1922. Germany & Russia continued to have good relations after Rapallo. The German foreign minister from 1923-1929, Gustav Stresemann, keen to maintain cooperative relations with Russia, and the Soviet foreign minister, Georgy Chicherin, was committed to a pro- German foreign policy.

1925 – Stresemann’s attempts – restore Germanys diplomatic position in Europe led to the Locarno treaties, a wide ranging set of agreements aimed the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1926 reflected this mood, especially o the German side.

German government – stated Treaty of Belin – adopting the agreement at Rapallo to a new political situation. The consolidation of relations with Russia was popular in Germany on the Russian side.

The term of the treaty talked in general terms about trust & cooperation between German people and the peoples of the USSR and about promoting general peace.

Article 1 –stated importance of Rapallo – basis for friendly German-soviet relations with regard to all political and economic questions affect their two countries.

Article 2 – stated if either country was attacked by a 3rd power the other would remain neutral in the conflict.

Article 4 – stated that treaty wo

uld remain in force for 5 years – and that the 2 states would discuss in good time the future their political relations.

USSR – gained economic benefits from Berlin treaty – June 1926 – USSR received large financial credits from German Bank, God relations continued unt the death of Stresemann – 1929 which coincided with the beginnings of the world economic crisis. Also, 1928-1929 time when Stalin began to take a radically different line on the role of the Comintern.

Changes in the Comintern:

1924-1929 – Comintern – low prior for Stalin. He had been far more concerned with internal affairs – winning power and developing polices of socialism in one country. Stalin’s attitude and actions relating o china 1925-27 were typical of his general approach at that time. As his grip on power tightened during 1929 – but Stalin was moving towards a radical new policy in foreign affairs, as part of his Stalin revolution. The beginnings of Stalin’s revolution from above were most obviously to be seen in the high tempo set for the programme of industrialisation and the brutal position of forced collectivisation through Stalin’s war against the kulaks but it was also apparent in Stalin’s sudden switch to more aggressive ambitions abroad. At 6th Comintern Congress – July 1928 – Stalin put forward his view the world situation was changing that world capitalism was facing a terminal crisis, and had the time was right for an attack on anti-Communist social democratic parties in Europe – Stalin termed them ‘social fascists’ and the deadliest enemies of socialism. Stalin pushed the Comintern to purge weak elements and to prepare for a return to fight to spread revolution across the world. It is hard to know why Stalin pushed more aggressive policies in 1928. Understandable Trotsky & supporters condemned Stalin for being hypocritical. But Stalin had been a man of genuine revolutionary instincts in 1917-1919, and he may have been simply reverting to type one the need for socialism in one country had passed. There is another possible reason, in that the strongest appointment of Stalin’s new line was Bukharist it could be that Stalin’s main purpose was to pick up a political fight with him, Soviet control over Comintern became tighter. Stalin our loyal years on the communist parties in countries such as France, Germany and Italy. Soviet agents were sent abroad to infiltrate foreign communist parties and report back to Moscow. Many foreign communist leaders were encouraged to come to the USSR, possibly to join the area to drive to sharpen communist illusions that the comintern was an international brotherhood were dropped.

Comintern:

  • Phases of Comintern
  • Get Russia out of WW1
  • Win the CW
  • Recovery and peace
  • Comintern = left
  • Lenin – saw failed attempts in Berlin and Munich, Hungary Comm gov lasted only 4 months
  • Convinced Lenin Communism could only be achieved if the Bolshevik model was adopted
    • Leninist principles – centralisation and discipline, no freedom of action
    • Prepare for civil war – underground organisations, spread propaganda, create cells in trade unions
    • All activity had to be approved by Comintern
  • Focus on USSR national security – reduced appeal of workers elsewhere
  • Financial support and intentions of Comintern affected chance of stable commercial and diplomatic relations
  • Changes in Comintern – leaders:
    • Zinoviev, Bukharin, Molotov
  • 1928 – left turn of Comintern: encouraged socialists to disregard liberals
    • Split political left – became disunited
    • One reason Hitler was able to rise to power

Stalinist cult of personality:

  • 1924 – modest image, hard-working man, takes on mantle of Lenin’s disciple
    • Tsaritsyn -> Stalingrad – 1925
  • 1931 – portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin appear – show him as natural way forward
  • 1933-39 – Stalin’s image = reassurance
    • Strong leader through 1st FYP disruption and confusion of terror
    • Socialist realism emerges – art glorifies Stalin as leader, shows idealised future
    • 1938 – Short Course – history of All-Union Communist Party
      • History reinterpreted in Stalin’s favour – show him as key
    • War looms – all-powerful leader image
  • 1945 onwards – image cemented by success as war leader
    • Childhood home = shrine
    • God-like solitude

70th birthday celebrations = elaborate, image projected into sky, celebrations for over a year

Like Lenin. Stalin relied on propaganda machine to harness support for policies. Images of happy productive workers reinforced socialist message behind industrialisation and collectivisation. New initiative like the 1st year plan – 1928 were sold as the inspiration of the all-knowing Great Leader. Stalin frequently presenting him alongside Marx or Lenin. Stain lost no opportunity to reinforce his own position through using his associations with Lenin, backed by slogans such as Stalin is the Lenin of Today.

By 1929 – basis of Stalin cult – already established. Stalin’s image was fixed as the Great Helmsman steering the ship of state through the dangers threatening Russia and as Lenin’s true successor. Lenin had never sought to create a cult himself, but a Lenin cult grew rapidly after his death. Largely through the effort if Stalin who wanted t to appear as Lenin’s disciple and heir. By the late 1920s Lenin was being treated like a god whose words held the answer to all Russian problems. Stalin even insisted on having the body embalmed and Lenin’s tomb turned into a shrine such actions increased Stalin’s own status. Stalin’s main aim in foreign affairs – to keep Russia safe while concentrating on domestic affairs to build socialism in one country. But complete isolation from the outside world was not possible. Stalin had to deal with pressing concerns abroad especially in relation to Chin and Germany. He also had to take into account the Comintern and its continuing influence. To Stalin the Comintern was an unwelcome nuisance, a hangover from the failed dreams of achieving permanent t world revolution – but he could never state this openly:
Stalin’s chief representative in foreign affairs was Georgii Chicherin, backed by his able deputy, Maskim Litvinov. Both were polished diplomats with a moderate & reassuring image; they were regarded by Stalin as very useful in maintaining safe relations with foreign powers especially Germany.